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1) Introduction Back to top
Over the last several years, polls have
consistently found majority support for the general principle of
contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping operations. A June 1999 Gallup poll for CNN/USA Today asked, Do you approve
or disapprove of American troops participating in peace-keeping
forces under the United Nations command?
A very strong 75% said they approved with just 24% saying
they disapproved. Most
recently, in a July 2000 PIPA poll, more than two-thirds (68%) favored,
as a general rule &contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping
operations. Just 27% were opposed. The Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations quadrennial survey of US attitudes on foreign policy in
November 1998 found 57% believed that when the US is asked to be
part of a UN peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world
the US should take part. Twenty percent preferred to "leave
this job to other countries and 16% volunteered that it depends
on the circumstances. " In a March 1997 Roper Starch poll, respondents were asked
whether they would support using US troops "to be part of a
United Nations peacekeeping force wherever needed." Seventy-two
percent said they "definitely would" (35%) or "probably
would" (37%) support doing so. Interestingly, the percentage
saying that they definitely would support using US troops for UN
peacekeeping (35%) was higher than for doing so "if close allies
of the US are attacked" (31%) or "to maintain military
presence in overseas areas of vital interest to the US" (28%).
Even in the fall of 1993, shortly after
the deaths of the 18 US rangers in Mogadishu, Somalia, support was
fairly strong. In October 1993 NBC found 71% support and ABC found
58% support for contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping operations.
A month later, ABC found 60% in favor.
Earlier data also show that when respondents are given varied options
for specifying conditions under which the US would contribute troops,
the total number supporting contributing, under at least some circumstances,
was very high. In the February 1994 PIPA poll, given three options,
49% said the US should contribute troops to UN peacekeeping forces
"in most cases," another 42% said "only in exceptional
cases that directly affect US interests," and only 5% said
"never." Thus a total of 91% were supportive in at least
some cases. In October 1994, a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
found 51% saying that "in general, when the United States is
asked to be part of a UN peacekeeping force in a troubled part of
the world," the US should take part, while 23% volunteered
that they would favor participation in some circumstances but not
others, and 19% said we should "leave this job to other countries."
Apparently not all Americans are clear
that when a UN peacekeeping operation is undertaken, the US has
approved of it in the UN Security Council, and if they were clear,
apparently, it would raise support. Presented the argument: "If
the US votes in favor of a UN peacekeeping operation, then, as a
general rule, the US should be willing to contribute at least some
troops to that operation," an overwhelming 88% agreed substantially
more than the 65% who answered favorably when asked whether they
favored contributing troops (PIPA, April 1995).
Most Americans feel that participation in UN peacekeeping is appropriate
for the US military. They reject the argument, commonly made in
Washington, that participation undermines the readiness of US forces
or dulls their fighting edge. For example, in the April 1995 PIPA
poll, only 33% of respondents approved the idea that participation
undermines the readiness of US troops for other duties. But 61%
agreed with the opposing view that "...in UN peacekeeping operations,
they are getting valuable experience that will probably be useful
in the future." Similarly, only 43% agreed and 54% disagreed
that "Putting American soldiers into UN peacekeeping will dull
their fighting edge, because unlike regular combat, they are constantly
required to restrain themselves from using force. This is bad for
US defense." A man in a Baltimore focus group echoed the sentiments
of many polled when he said: "[Participating in a] UN peacekeeping
force would be better than sitting back home playing [war] games,
because, to me, you are on the line there."
2) Factors Influencing
Support for Contributing to Specific Operations
Back to top
While the majority of Americans tends to support contributing troops
to UN peacekeeping operations in principle, poll questions about
specific operations reveal substantial variations. These may result
from differences, sometimes fairly subtle, in the wording of questions,
as well as from variations in the conditions surrounding a specific
operation. The most prominent factors are organized around the following
questions:
a) Is the US Contributing its Fair Share? Back to top
Consistent with the general feeling that the US carries more than
its share in international efforts there are strong indications
that support for US participation in UN peacekeeping is significantly
diminished by the perception that the US generally contributes more
than its fair share. As one man in a Kalamazoo focus group said:
"I think we should contribute troops, but I kind of disagree
on the scale we seem to do it all the time. We always go right to
the forefront, and some of these other nations that are supposedly
part of the UN don't have their heart and soul in it like we do."
However, this assumption is largely based on misperceptions, and
when they are corrected attitudes change sharply. PIPA
examined this issue extensively in 1994 and 1995. April 1995 poll, a majority of 60% said that: "As compared
to other UN countries...the number of troops the US is presently
contributing to UN peacekeeping is more than its fair share."
But when respondents were asked to guess what percentage of the
troops participating were in fact American, the median response
was 40% ten times the actual percentage at that time. The median
preferred level of a US contribution to UN peacekeeping was 20%.
PIPA then asked respondents how they would regard a contribution
of 4%, without revealing that this was the actual amount. Only 9%
thought that such a contribution would be too much down from the
60% who had originally said the US contributes more than its fair
share. Forty-three percent of respondents thought this proportion
would be about right, while 40% found it too little.
There have been additional misperceptions. In February 1994, PIPA
found that 79% of respondents believed that the US had contributed
troops to most (61%) or all (18%) UN operations; whereas in fact
the US has rarely contributed troops over the UN's history.
There are strong indications that support for US participation in
peacekeeping in Bosnia is also diminished by the assumption that
the US is or would be contributing more than its fair share of troops.
In April 1995, when the US was only contributing 2.5% of the troops
to the peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia, PIPA asked
respondents to estimate what percentage of the troops there were
American. The median estimate was 30% about twelve times the actual
level. A full 90% of respondents overestimated.
Apparently this misperception was suppressing support for contributing
US troops at that time which ranged from 34% (CBS, November 1994)
to 52% (PIPA, April 1995) in various polls. When respondents were
asked what an "appropriate" percentage would be, only
13% said the US should not contribute any troops while an overwhelming
83% specified some percentage to be contributed far more than the
number who said they favored contributing troops per se. This suggests
that many who said that they opposed participation per se were actually
expressing opposition to the presumed level of US participation.
The overestimation of the level of US participation persisted for
the NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. In January 1996, Pew
found that only 21% of Americans knew that the US was providing
less than half (in fact one-third) of the NATO troops in Bosnia
to enforce the Dayton agreement. In July 1996 PIPA found a more
modest overestimation asked to estimate the percentage of troops
that were American, the median estimate was 40%. In Pew's poll,
among those who thought correctly that the US contribution was less
than half of the force, 54% approved the decision to send troops;
but among those who thought that US troops made up "most"
of the peacekeeping force, only 45% approved.
In those situations where the US is undertaking only a minor
part of a UN peacekeeping operation, support can be overwhelming
if the facts are understood. A PIPA question (October 1999) delineated
the US role in the UN's East Timor operation:
As you may know, there is a UN peacekeeping force in East Timor.
This force is restoring order after the violence following the vote
for East Timor independence from Indonesia. The total force is about
6,000 troops, mostly from Australia. The US has contributed about
200 troops, mostly to help with transport and communications, but
not for combat. Do you approve or disapprove of the US contributing
200 troops to the UN peacekeeping force in East Timor?
Seventy-one percent approved, while 25% disapproved. By contrast,
when Gallup asked in September 1999 simply whether respondents would
favor or oppose "the US sending in military troops as part
of the international peacekeeping force in East Timor," 34%
were in favor and 59% rejected the idea.
Similarly, in early June 1999, as the NATO campaign
in Kosovo concluded, several polls attempted to measure support
for committing US troops to the peacekeeping effort there. When
it was made clear that the US was contributing only a small percentage
of the overall troop contingent, support was much higher than for
questions that provided less information. For example, a Gallup
poll found that just a slim majority (52%) supported sending 7,000
US ground troops along with troops from other countries to serve
as peacekeepers in Kosovo (45% opposed). Yet, when an ABC News poll
specifically noted that the 7,000 US soldiers would be part of an
international peacekeeping force that included 43,000 troops from
other countries , support for deployment of US troops was far higher
-- 71% in favor and only 27% opposed.
In a series of questions in June 1996,
PIPA attempted to factor out the opposition due to the (mis)perceived
level of US contributions from attitudes about contributing troops
per se. The poll found underlying majority support for contributing
some level of troops. First PIPA used a standard question borrowed
from a January 1996 poll by Pew that asked respondents whether they
"approve or disapprove of President Clinton's decision to send
20,000 US troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping
force." While the Pew poll did mention that the operation would
be international, it did not state that other countries would be
supplying the majority of the troops. Forty-eight percent said they
approved while, 49% said they disapproved. PIPA repeated the same
question with half the sample in the June 1996 PIPA poll and produced
a similar result 51% approve, 44% disapprove.
However, the other half-sample of respondents was asked instead
what percentage of the troops they would like to see the US contributing,
with "none" being a clearly stated option. In this context,
68% said the US should contribute some troops, while only 30% said
that the US should contribute none. Thus it appears that some respondents
in the standard favor-oppose question refrain from expressing their
support because they disapprove of the level of US participation
that they assume, though not necessarily disapproving participation
in the operation per se. When they were given the ability to specify
the percentage of US troops, the number favoring contributing some
troops jumped from a bare majority to a strong majority.
This does not mean, though, that most Americans would be happy with
the actual level the US contributed at that time a third. Among
those who favored contributing some troops, the median preference
was 25%.
A fairly strong majority, in July 1996, also supported maintaining
US involvement in Bosnia beyond December 1996, should US and other
NATO leaders decide this were necessary. Fifty-nine percent favored
committing some troops beyond December, while 38% said they would
not want to contribute any. But among those who favored contributing,
the median preferred level of contribution was 20%.
A similar dynamic occurred in relation to the question of contributing
US troops, should the UN establish a peacekeeping operation in Burundi
to prevent genocide. As in the Bosnia questions, half the sample
was asked a standard question and 57% said they would favor contributing
US troops (38% opposed). When the other half was given the option
of setting the level of US troops (with zero explicitly allowed),
66% said the US should contribute some troops while just 31% said
that the US should not contribute any. Among those who favored contributing
some, the median preferred level was 20%.
b) Is the Operation Clearly Multilateral? Back to top
Americans are highly sensitive about operations being either
multilateral or unilateral. As discussed in website section on America's
role in the world, the majority is very hesitant about ever using
military force unilaterally though relatively comfortable with the
idea of being part of a multilateral operation. Often respondents
are unclear about whether a proposed operation is multilateral or
not. Therefore the wording of the question is highly critical in
determining the response. Questions that clearly spell out that
the US would be contributing to a UN operation receive much higher
levels of support for participation than questions that simply ask
about sending US troops, apparently giving the impression that the
US would be the sole contributor. Questions that say that other
countries would contribute troops without specifically mentioning
the UN elicit intermediate levels of support.
For example, from October 1993 on, various polls asked Americans
whether they favored or opposed the US intervening in Haiti with
military force. The majority public consistently rejected intervention
when it was simply described as a US action support never broke
out of the 14% to 36% range. When respondents were asked about US
participation in a multilateral force with other countries without
mention of UN sponsorship support was lukewarm, ranging from 38%
to 51%. However, when the operation was described as a UN operation
to which the US could be contributing, the majority supported US
participation. Shortly after the UN Security Council voted for a
resolution authorizing intervention a moment when the operation
was perhaps most closely linked to the UN in the public eye a CBS/New
York Times poll in August 1994 found 64% support for US participation.
In PIPA's July 1994 poll, a modest majority (54%) expressed support
for such US participation in a UN operation, while in the same poll
an overwhelming majority of 73% opposed a unilateral US intervention.
At the time of the mass killings in Rwanda in mid-1994, polls asked
about sending US troops to stop the violence. Questions that specified
that the US would be contributing to a UN operation found the strongest
support. In July 1994, PIPA asked about contributing troops, together
with other countries, to a hypothetical UN peacekeeping force to
set up safe havens in Rwanda. Sixty percent favored it, while 61%
even favored contributing to a UN force of 20,000 to 100,000 to
occupy Rwanda and forcibly stop the killing. A poll that spoke of
a UN mission in Rwanda but did not specify whether other countries
would be contributing troops, found 45% support for sending US troops
(Time/CNN, May 1994). When asked whether respondents simply favored
or opposed "the United States sending in ground troops,"
only 28% were in favor, with 61% opposed.
Similar patterns appeared in relation to Bosnia. Between January
and May 1993, six different polls simply asked about sending US
ground troops to Bosnia and found on average 43% support. However
when four other polls presented it as a multilateral action, average
support was 60%. From mid-September 1995 through January 1996, there
was again extensive polling. In thirteen cases, poll questions simply
asked whether respondents favored or opposed sending US troops to
Bosnia and elicited, on average, just 37% support. However when
CNN/USA Today/Gallup postulated a UN peacekeeping force in September
1995, it found 52% support. In December 1995 Wirthlin offered the
options of the US being part of a UN operation, a NATO operation,
or no international action only 25% chose no action, while 67% chose
a multilateral operation (50% UN, 17% NATO). Similarly, during the
same period a majority rejected the idea that the US had a responsibility
to "end the fighting" (Time /CNN 59%) or "to enforce
the peace agreement" (CBS, 59%). However, 53% felt the "US
has a moral obligation to help keep the peace in Bosnia" (emphasis
added) in Gallup/CNN/USA Today's September poll.
c) Is the Operation Likely to Succeed? Back to top
Another factor that has influenced support for specific operations,
primarily in the negative direction, is the question of whether
an operation is likely to succeed or if American soldiers might
be put at risk in a losing effort. Apparently a substantial portion
of the opposition to participation is derived from a lack of confidence
in the operation more than an opposition to contributing in principle.
Support for the NATO operation in Bosnia
has been highly influenced by the perception of success. In September 1997 Pew found only a light
plurality of 48% favored extending the mission. Pew also found that only 27% felt the
operation had improved the chances of finding a way to permanently
end the fighting there, while 61% said it had not. In a February-March 1998 PIPA poll, using the same Pew question,
the percentage that believed that the operation was succeeding in
creating peace rose to 49%.
Accordingly support for extending the mission also rose to
57%. Specific respondents perception of success
was also highly correlated with support.
This factor was explored as a general principle in a uly 1994 PIPA
poll. When asked if the US should contribute troops to UN peacekeeping
operations in general, 73% answered affirmatively, while 24% were
opposed. Members of the opposing minority were then asked whether
they would favor or oppose contributing US troops "if you were
pretty sure that a specific UN peacekeeping operation would be successful
in achieving its objectives." Of the 24% previously opposed,
48% shifted their position to favor contributing US troops. Thus
only 11% of the total sample constituted a hardcore opposition,
while 85% said they would be supportive if they had confidence in
success.
There
are strong indications also that concerns about success have been
a potent factor affecting public attitudes concerning the operation
in Bosnia for many years. In May 1993 PIPA found 77% support for
contributing US troops to police a peace agreement in Bosnia. By
April 1995, when the UN operation in Bosnia was not going well and
overwhelming majorities were expressing frustration with the passivity
of the operation, PIPA found support for contributing troops in
the event of a peace agreement had eroded to 52%. Apparently, there
was low confidence that the peace agreement would be effective a
majority of 61% said they believed the chances were high that there
would be violations of such an agreement "if the UN were committed
to just monitoring" the agreement the position being taken
by the UN at that time. (However, only 38% took this position "if
the UN were committed to enforce compliance with the agreement,
by military means if necessary.")
Despite the breakthroughs that led to the Dayton peace agreement
in fall 1995, public support for US participation in Bosnia peacekeeping
operations remained at spring 1995 levels. In November 1995, Gallup
found just 47% support for contributing troops while CBS found that
only 20% thought, "NATO peacekeepers will be able to enforce
the peace agreement," while 69% thought "there will be
serious fighting among the factions."
Nonetheless, in the same month, November 1995, when PIPA asked respondents
to consider a scenario in which the US contributes troops and the
operation succeeds, a fairly strong majority expressed support even
when they were asked to assume that the operation would cost American
lives. They were told:
Imagine
that in the course of carrying out this operation over the next
year, there is an incident in which 50 American soldiers die fighting
in a confrontation with a rogue band that resists the peace agreement.
But overall, the operation succeeds in maintaining the peace and
stopping ethnic cleansing.
In this case, 60% said
they would feel that "in contributing US troops to the operation"
the US "had done the right thing," while 32% said they
would feel that the US "had made a mistake." Thus, though,
Americans expectations of success had been beaten down over the
years of war in Bosnia and did not immediately rebound after the
international community changed course and took strong action, when
asked to assume success even in the context of American deaths respondents
showed underlying support in principle.
In July 1994, PIPA posed a series of questions on Haiti that were
similar to those PIPA posed about the general relationship between
perceived likelihood of success and overall support for peacekeeping.
As noted earlier, in July 1994 a modest majority (54%) supported
US intervention if it took place as part of a UN peacekeeping force,
while 41% opposed the idea. Respondents who said they would oppose
UN intervention, even if the president and Congress decided to contribute
troops 24% of the total sample were asked how they would respond
"if new information came to light, showing that this operation
had a high likelihood of success." Under these changed circumstances,
26% of this group said they would shift position and support UN
intervention. This left less than one-fifth of the total sample
18% of all respondents constituting the hard-core opposition,
resolved to oppose the action irrespective of its potential to succeed.
An examination of the responses to differently worded questions
about the possibility of introducing US troops into a Kosovo peacekeeping
operation have also revealed a strong concern about success. Americans
are strongly supportive of participating in peacekeeping when there
is actually peace to keep, but they are far more hesitant to commit
troops in order to bring peace about. For example, in late March
1999, a Pew question noted that there was some talk of sending 4,000
US troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force of about 30,000 troops,
to help secure peace in Kosovo, Serbia. (emphasis added).
Only 44% approved of this idea while 49% were opposed. However,
in the same week, a Time/CNN survey found that 59% supported sending
an unspecified number of US and NATO peacekeeping forces &if
the Yugoslav government signs a peace agreement. Two polls taken
at the same time in early May 1999 obtained similar results. A CBS
News poll asked, In order to try and end the fighting in
Kosovo, would you favor or oppose the United States sending in ground
troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force? (again, emphasis added).
In this case, 45% were in favor, but 48% were opposed. At the same
time, a Gallup poll asked, "If a peace agreement is worked
out between the Yugoslavian Serbs and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority
would you favor or oppose sending US ground troops along with troops
from other countries to serve as peacekeepers in the region? "
This question produced a much more positive response, with two-thirds
(67%)in favor and just 31% opposed.
d) Is the US Leadership Acting Coherently and Decisively?
Back to top
Most poll questions about participating in UN operations
have been asked at times when policymakers have either not yet made
a decision about whether to go forward, or when the leadership is
divided between the president who has decided to move forward and
Congress, which has largely been opposed. Apparently this lack of
coherent and decisive leadership causes Americans to show less support
for contributing troops than they would otherwise. Polls suggest
that once the president together with congressional approval makes
a clear decision to contribute troops, support would be significantly
higher than standard poll questions indicate.
In a July 1994 PIPA poll, initially 54% said they would support
contributing troops to a UN operation in Haiti. The 41% who said
they were opposed were then asked, if the president and Congress
were to decide to intervene, whether they would support the decision.
Forty-three percent of this group said they would then change their
minds thus raising the total number in support by 17% to 71%. (Conversely,
46% of respondents who favored UN intervention would support a decision
by the president and Congress to not support UN intervention, thus
increasing the number not supporting UN intervention by 25% to 64%.)
Similar results were found when respondents were polled about Rwanda.
Initially, 60% said they would support contributing US troops to
a very limited UN operation in Rwanda and 61% to a more large-scale
operation. If the president and Congress made a clear decision to
contribute US troops to UN peacekeeping forces, an additional 13%-15%
of respondents said they would change their position and support
the policy, thus raising the totals in support to 73-76%. If the
president and Congress decided against contributing, in both cases
an even larger 35-36% said they would change their position, bringing
support for not contributing to 70-72%.
When PIPA posed a hypothetical peacekeeping operation for Burundi,
support was substantially lower when it was assumed that there would
be conflict between the president and Congress. In PIPA's June 1996
poll, a 57% majority (in response to a standard question) initially
supported contributing US troops to a possible mission in Burundi.
But when respondents were asked whether they would support contributing
US troops if the president favored doing so but a majority in Congress
were opposed, support dropped from 57% to 43% and opposition increased
from 38% to 52%.
Given that the president and Congress were in conflict about contributing
troops to the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, this suggests
that had the leadership acted more coherently, support would have
been significantly higher than it was.
e) Could the Operation Mitigate Widespread Civilian
Suffering? Back to top
Another critical factor affecting public support is the perceived
potential for minimizing large-scale civilian suffering. Approval
ratings for contributing troops to specific operations are consistently
higher when respondents are told that UN intervention may allay
civilian deaths and suffering as opposed to operations less directly
linked to civilian welfare, such as the enforcing of a truce after
a government breakdown.
Support is high in
principle as well, even when an operation is not directly linked
to the national interest. In PIPA's April 1995 poll, 68% agreed:
"When innocent civilians are suffering or are being killed,
and a UN peacekeeping operation is being organized to try to address
the problem, in most cases the US should be willing to contribute
some troops, whether or not it serves the national interest"
(emphasis added).
Perhaps the clearest case of the variable affect of this factor
was the reaction to the operation in Somalia. The public strongly
favored the humanitarian goals of the Somalia mission from the beginning,
and expressed increasing support in its early stages. Sixty-six
percent of Americans approved of "Bush's plan to send American
military forces to assure the distribution of relief" in a
Gallup poll during December 1992. Seventy-five percent of respondents
approved of the plan in a Harris poll that same month. A Los Angeles
Times poll in the middle of January 1993 registered an overwhelming
84% approving (53% strongly) of the president's decision to send
US troops. All three polls highlighted the mission's humanitarian
aspect in its questions.
But by September before the American deaths in the Mogadishu firefight
on October 3 as the humanitarian crisis began to ease and UN troops
became increasingly involved in the conflict with the Somali warlord
Mohammed Farah Aideed, support for the operation faded. When CNN/USA
Today reminded respondents in September that US troops "have
recently been engaged in military combat with Somalian warlords,"
only 39% said they thought "the US should continue this role
of active military involvement," while 57% thought it should
stop.
When the Mogadishu firefight left 18 US soldiers killed and 75 US
soldiers injured, this did not lead a majority to want immediate
withdrawal, though a majority continued to be uncomfortable with
the mission and to support an eventual withdrawal. (See below for
a fuller discussion.) In PIPA's October 1993 poll, the argument
that overall received the highest level of support was one that
affirmed the intervention's humanitarian aspect. Seventy-five percent
of respondents found convincing the argument that: "Our purpose
in going to Somalia was to deliver food to the starving people.
We performed this mission well, and this is something we can be
proud of. But we can never hope to solve the Somalis political problems
for them. Now that people are eating, our job is done, and it is
time to bring our boys home."
Polls taken since the Somalia operation suggest that a strong majority
still endorses its humanitarian objectives. In April 1995 PIPA found
that an overwhelming 82% thought that attempting to deliver humanitarian
aid "was the right thing to do," while 14% saw it as a
mistake. By contrast, roughly half as many respondents, 43%, approved
of the US trying to end the civil war, while 46% labeled that political
goal a mistake.
In general, rationales that stress the humanitarian dimension tend
to elicit high levels of support. For a UN peacekeeping operation
in Bosnia in April 1994, 69% found convincing the argument that:
"For moral reasons, the US should contribute some of its troops,
together with other countries, to efforts to try to end the bloodshed."
In August 1994, 65% found convincing the argument: "Haitians
who supported Aristide in free elections are being murdered by death
squads of the military regime. For moral reasons, the US should
contribute troops to a UN effort to stop these atrocities."
A December 1995 CBS/New York Times poll asked respondents to evaluate
a number of reasons for sending US troops to Bosnia. Sixty-four
percent agreed that since "hundreds of thousands of people
have been killed in the war in Bosnia...stopping more people from
being killed in this war [was a ] good enough reason," while
63% endorsed the reason of "keeping the war in Bosnia from
spreading to other parts of Europe." Faring much more poorly
in the poll were two reasons related to the US's dominant role:
that "the United States helped negotiate the Bosnian peace
agreement" (35%), or "maintaining the United States role
as a world leader" (29%).
Similar results were found in a June 1995 Times Mirror poll that
asked about contributing US troops in principle to different kinds
of UN operations (though they were not described as UN "peacekeeping
"). Sixty-three percent approved of "sending UN forces,
including some US military forces, to Asian or African countries
in order to prevent famines and mass starvation," and 52% approved
of doing so to "prevent one side from slaughtering the other
in a regional conflict." Operations that did not stress the
humanitarian dimension did more poorly. Just 47% approved of contributing
to operations "to restore law and order in Asian and African
countries if the governments break down," and just 46% approved
of operations "to keep peace when two sides in a conflict have
called a truce."
In focus groups, a recurring theme was that the US should contribute
to UN peacekeeping operations because of the large-scale suffering
of innocent civilians. A Kalamazoo woman said: "You can't stay
back and watch and allow other people to live this way...I tend
to look at what has happened to their freedom, their dignity, their
lives. For me, it's on a personal level." Numerous participants
echoed the comment of another Kalamazoo man: "Suffering is
the key thing."
3) Preference for Making Peacekeeping Duty Voluntary
Back to top
One final concern of the public that undercuts support for contributing
US troops to UN peacekeeping in general is a discomfort with requiring
US soldiers to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Apparently,
many Americans see these operations as a special category of duty
for US soldiers. In focus groups, respondents expressed ambivalence
about ordering GIs to risk death and injury in missions that are
not undertaken in defense of the US or its vital interests. Numerous
participants including those supportive of UN peacekeeping expressed
the conviction that US soldiers had volunteered to defend the nation
and its vital interests, not to carry out humanitarian operations.
This issue was dramatized by the well publicized court martial of
army medic Michael New for refusing to participate in a UN peacekeeping
force.
Consistent with these feelings, a very strong majority would prefer
to make UN peacekeeping duty voluntary. Given two options, just
36% of respondents felt that "US soldiers should be required
to participate in UN peacekeeping," while 62% said individual
soldiers should "be able to choose whether or not to participate"
(PIPA, June 1996).
In October 1993 shortly after the American deaths in Somalia 71%
said in a PIPA poll that they would support the idea of having US
contingents made up of soldiers who had volunteered for a UN peacekeeping
mission (22%) opposed), while an overwhelming 79% favored having
specialized units within the US military made up of soldiers who
had volunteered and were trained for peacekeeping operations. This
high support appeared even higher when PIPA re-asked the questions
in April 1995; 83% then supported US contingents made up of volunteers
and 88% favored specialized units for which soldiers could volunteer.
If such an option were granted, it is likely there would be a dramatic
increase in support for US participation. In the June 1996 poll,
57% said they favored contributing troops to UN peacekeeping, 36%
were opposed, and 7% said "don't know." Those who said
they were opposed or undecided were then asked how they would feel
if the soldiers "had volunteered in advance for this kind of
duty." In that instance, 59% of that group (25% of the total
sample) said they would favor contributing US troops thus raising
the total number of those in support to an overwhelming 82%. Similarly,
in April 1994 the provision for volunteering raised support for
contributing troops to a UN peacekeeping operation to enforce a
possible Bosnia agreement from 73% to 87% (PIPA).
This preference for allowing soldiers to decline to participate
in peacekeeping operations does not mean, however, that most Americans
feel the US military does not have the right to require it. PIPA
asked the 62% of respondents who favored granting soldiers the choice
whether they felt "the US military has the right to require
a US soldier to participate in a UN peacekeeping mission."
Of this group, only 46% said the military does not have the right.
Thus only 29% of the total sample took the position that the military
does not have such a right though a majority also would prefer that
the military create a situation so that the conflict does not arise.
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