Do Americans support peacekeeping?

Summary: A strong majority of Americans supports the idea of peacekeeping. Support is derived from self-interest as well as humanitarian concerns. At times this support has softened as Americans have become frustrated with the passivity and ineffectiveness of some peacekeeping operations. However, this frustration most often leads Americans to want peacekeeping operations to be more robust rather than to cease.

Report Sections:
1) Introduction
2) Sources of Support
3) Reservations about UN Peacekeeping Performance
4) Preference for Robust Approach

1) Introduction  Back to top

As a general rule, when it comes to the use of military force Americans strongly prefer to act in conjunction with other nations through a multilateral organization, especially the United Nations.  In a July 2000 PIPA poll, >hen offered three options for when it becomes necessary for the US to use military force  only 17% preferred for the US to act on its own, while 49% preferred working through the UN and another 26% preferred working through NATO. In an April 1995 PIPA poll, an overwhelming 89% agreed with the statement, "When there is a problem in the world that requires the use of military force, it is generally best for the US to address the problem together with other nations working through the UN rather than going it alone.

Poll questions that query attitudes about peacekeeping in principle have consistently shown high levels of support. Although none have been asked in the last few years, in the April 1995 PIPA poll, 67% said they favored "the idea of UN peacekeeping" (25% opposed). In the February 1994 PIPA poll support was even higher--84% were in favor (46% strongly), with 13% opposed. (For general attitudes about US participation in UN peacekeeping, see related report: Do Americans favor contributing US troops to peacekeeping operations?).

Research indicates also that a majority of Americans would support the UN having a standingmultinational contingent dedicated to peacekeeping kinds of activities. In November 1999, Harris Interactive found that 64% agreed and 29% disagreed with the statement that We need to have some kind of truly international army, with troops from many countries, that can be used in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, or Rwanda where national governments fail to protect the lives, or even encourage the killing, of their own people. In PIPA's October 1999 poll, for example, 53% said they supported the idea of having a standing United Nations peacekeeping force made up of individuals who were not part of a national army but had independently volunteered to be part of the UN force. Forty-one percent opposed the idea. Additionally, in an April 1999 Newsweek poll, 65% said they would support a semi-permanent peacekeeping force in Kosovo and other trouble areas in the Balkans (28% opposed).

Support is quite strong for intervening when a atrocities, especially genocide, are being committed. In November 1999, Harris found that 77% thought that in principle &there are some times when other countries have the right to intervene to protect people from their own government. Only 15% rejected that principle. In the same poll, 71% felt that countries have a duty to intervene when a government commits terrible atrocities against its own people. In PIPA's October 1999 poll, an overwhelming 77% agreed with the statement that "If a government is committing atrocities against its people so that a significant number of people are being killed, at some point the countries of the world, including the US, should intervene with force if necessary to stop the killing." Even when a similar argument in favor of intervention was paired against a statement arguing for the inviolability of state sovereignty, as in PIPA's May 1999 poll, a strong 62% still favored the idea of intervention. Also, In a February 1994 PIPA poll, Support was overwhelming for sending in UN peacekeeping forces "when atrocities are being committed against large numbers of people" (83% 63% strongly), or when "gross human rights violations are being committed against large numbers of people" (81% 58% strongly).

There is also strong but more modest support for participating in operations undertaken to ensure a truce or peace agreement. The February 1994 PIPA gauged support for "sending in UN peacekeeping forces when the combatants in a civil war want the UN to help try to resolve the conflict" 69% favored it (39% strongly) with 24% opposed. In April 1995, PIPA posed a scenario in an unnamed country: two ethnic groups on the brink of civil war have made a joint request to the UN for a force to police the country until new elections are held. Sixty-eight percent said they would favor "having the UN take part in this kind of operation," even when reminded that "this would mean that the UN might have to use force to keep order." Twenty-nine percent were opposed. In the same poll 77% favored "the UN acting as an enforcer" when warring parties agree to put down their weapons and sign a peace agreement provided that the parties disarm.

As noted above, arguments against peacekeeping based on the principle of nonintervention have failed to draw majority support. In a February 1994 PIPA poll, 61% rejected as "unconvincing" the argument that: "Intervening in other people's problems, even as part of a UN peacekeeping operation, is too costly and too risky. Each country should just focus on its own concerns and let others take care of themselves." (convincing: 36%) Sixty percent found unconvincing the statement that "Strife and violence are an inevitable part of the development of nations. When UN peacekeeping forces try to intervene, they interfere with a natural process and tend to do more harm than good." (convincing: 36%)

Arguments against the US contributing to peacekeeping, based on its being a low priority for US national security, also did not do well. In April 1995, only 32% agreed--while 64% disagreed--with the argument: "Since the defense budget is being cut back, we should not use these diminishing resources for activities like UN peacekeeping because peacekeeping is a low priority for American security."

2) Sources of Support  Back to top

Support for peacekeeping is derived from both humanitarian and national interest concerns.

For many Americans, the prospect of genocide in particular creates a moral imperative for intervention. This is evident in attitudes about US involvement in Kosovo. In that case, moral considerations outweigh perceptions of the national interest in determining support for US action. For example, ABC News and ABC/Washington Post asked seven times during March and early April 1999 whether America's vital interests were at stake in Kosovo. Never did a majority say that they were, though most responses were closely divided. During the same period, however, four times ABC or Gallup asked if the US had a moral obligation to try to establish peace (ABC) or to help keep the peace in Kosovo (Gallup). Between 58% and 71% of respondents believed that the US did have a moral obligation to do so. In late April 1999, an NPR/Kaiser/Harvard survey found that, by that time, majorities thought the US had a moral obligation (58%) and viewed it as being in the national interest (55%) to help stop Serbian actions in Kosovo. When those who felt action in Kosovo was both in the national interest and a moral obligation were then asked which reason was most important, 68% chose moral obligation and 26% chose national interest.

Earlier polls support the idea of a strong moral element in support US action. In the July 1994 PIPA poll, respondents were asked: "If genocidal situations occur, do you think that the UN, including the US, should intervene with whatever force is necessary to stop the acts of genocide..." and were given four response options. Sixty-five percent said "always" (31%) or "in most cases" (34%), while 23% said "only when American interests are also involved." A mere 6% said "never." Asked how they would feel if a UN commission determined that genocide was occurring in Bosnia or Rwanda, 80% said they would favor intervention in both cases.

This moral conviction was strong in focus groups. "I think any reason for deciding whether someone lives or dies because of culture or race...or religion is wrong," said a Kalamazoo man in spring 1995. "If Bosnia was an issue of...territory, then maybe you should just let them fight it out. But...genocide is wrong and when that is occurring, something needs to be done to stop it."

Other more general humanitarian considerations play an important role as well. PIPA has found that basic moral arguments in support of UN peacekeeping are quite popular. Sixty-two percent found convincing the general argument: "Ending UN peacekeeping would be immoral because war and suffering would go on longer than they would have to, and many innocent people would die" (February 1994). For a UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, in April 1994, 69% found convincing the argument that "For moral reasons, the US should contribute some of its troops, together with other countries, to efforts to try to end the bloodshed. In July 1994, 65% found convincing the argument: "Haitians who supported Aristide in free elections are being murdered by death squads of the military regime. For moral reasons, the US should contribute troops to a UN effort to stop these atrocities."

One of the strongest self-interest concerns is that UN peacekeeping offers a way for the US to share the burden with other countries. In April 1995, an overwhelming 86% agreed that: "The only way for the US to not always be the world policeman is to allow the UN the means to perform some policing functions. UN peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries." In February 1994, 76% found this argument convincing.

The potential for long-term cost-saving also accounts for some of the public's support. In PIPA's February 1994 poll, 66% found convincing the argument that:

UN peacekeeping helps contribute to stability in the world. This makes it less likely the US will need to do expensive things like sending military aid and US troops to other countries. In the long run, if we don't spend money on UN peacekeeping, we will probably end up spending more money on defense.

3) Reservations about UN Peacekeeping Performance  Back to top

PIPA's earlier polling reveals that support for UN peacekeeping tends to soften in response to frustration about the performance of UN peacekeeping operations. As mentioned, while in February 1994, 84% said they favored the idea of UN peacekeeping, by April 1995 when the operation in Bosnia was having major problems the number dropped to 67%.

This frustration was clearly expressed in the April 1995 poll. An overwhelming 79% agreed that: "Overall, UN peacekeeping operations are not very successful because they tend to do just enough to keep the situation from getting totally out of hand, but not enough to really solve the problem." Similarly, 75% agreed that "UN peacekeeping operations are often ineffective and even dangerous because they send troops into civil wars without the means to defend themselves or the ability to deter attacks...UN troops end up being sitting ducks.

These feelings were summed up by a woman in a Los Alamos focus group in March 1995:

Right now the world is thumbing [its] nose at the United Nations...[UN troops] have no clout. There's nothing backing them up, and you don't solve a bully by giving in to him. You have to set your foot down [which means] you look bigger and stronger, and you act bigger and stronger, and you are bigger and stronger.

4) Preference for Robust Approach  Back to top

Although Americans are not always satisfied with the way UN peacekeeping operations work, the evidence suggests that rather than eschewing such initiatives altogether, the majority prefers a more muscular approach. PIPA examined this attitude extensively in an April 1995 poll. At that time, 70% said that UN peacekeeping forces should not be limited to mediating between warring parties; if mediation fails, they favored the UN having the option to escalate to the use of force to stop the violence. An overwhelming 79% favored allowing the UN to use force if UN aid convoys are attacked or obstructed. Sixty-eight percent favored "allowing UN troops to use military force" to defend civilians in a safe haven, even when told "keeping in mind that this might lead to military conflict with one side or the other." At the same time, there is concern that the UN act judiciously in its use of force: while 53% said they would like to see UN peacekeepers be "more assertive," 40% said they would like them to be "more cautious."

Respondents expressed a clear concern for the credibility of UN threats. Sixty-two percent said the UN has a "poor reputation for following through on its threats to use military force." An even higher number, 74%, felt that the UN should "strengthen its reputation for following through on its threats to use military force even if this means sometimes going into serious combat."

If the UN is in a strong position to act as an enforcer, it appears that more Americans would support UN peacekeeping operations. Asked whether they would support the UN acting to enforce a peace agreement between two warring parties, initially 61% favored it. However, when those who at first opposed enforcement were asked how they would feel if "both sides disarm enough so that the UN had more military power than either side, and if necessary could forcibly stop violations," an additional 16% said they would change their minds and support enforcement, raising the total to 77%.

Consistent with this emphasis on a more muscular approach, majorities also supported a more assertive posture in Bosnia. When in February 1994 NATO threatened air strikes if the Serbs did not stop shelling civilians, this elicited overwhelming support from respondents. The following spring strong majorities favored using force to protect aid convoys and to protect safe havens. In PIPA's April 1995 poll, when asked what they would like to see the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia do, 50% said that they would like to see them "get tougher," while only 29% said "withdraw" ("stay the course they are on," 13%). Eighty-seven percent (65% strongly) said they would like to see "UN peacekeepers use force if UN convoys delivering food and aid to Bosnians are attacked or obstructed." Sixty-five percent said they would like to see the UN "actively defend civilians in the safe havens if they are attacked," while only 30% said they were "concerned that this would get the UN peacekeepers too involved in the war."

The same poll even found strong support for intervening with a very large military force. Asked whether they would favor or oppose the UN threatening to intervene with a large military force of 150-300,000 troops, one-third of them American, "if the Bosnian Serbs continue to carry out ethnic cleansing," 64% favored this course of action, while just 26% were opposed. In a follow-up question, respondents were asked: "Regardless of whether you think the threat should be made, if the threat were made and the Serbs did not comply, do you think the UN should or should not follow through with their threat to intervene with a large military force to stop ethnic cleansing?" Sixty-six percent said the UN should then follow through.

While the NATO operation in Bosnia has been more assertive than the UN operation was, in recent years the majority has apparently still felt that it is not assertive enough. The highest-profile news story from the operation was the fact that Bosnian Serb leaders continue to run free and their separatist policies largely persist in violation of the Dayton accords. In PIPA's February-March 1998 poll a very strong majority 73% favored the NATO force in Bosnia arresting the two Bosnian Serb leaders charged with war crimes and turning them over to the World Court, even after hearing: "some say such an effort might lead to armed conflict as in Somalia, and some American troops might be killed, while others argue that these leaders are responsible for the systematic killing of thousands of civilians."

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