|
Report Sections
1) Introduction
2) Sources of Support
3) Balancing Domestic and International priorities
4) Bridging National and Global Values
5) Concerns US is Spending Too Much in International Efforts Relative
to other countries
1) Introduction
Back to top
Overall there is little evidence that Americans think US foreign
policy should be tied closely to US national interests, narrowly
defined. Arguments that call for limiting US engagement to cases
that directly involve US interests are not very popular. In PIPA's
January 1995 poll, only 22% agreed with the argument:
We should only
make commitments to send aid to parts of the world where we have
security interests. These include the former Soviet republics and
Eastern Europe where we want to prevent the reemergence of the Russian
empire, and the Middle East where we want to ensure access to oil.
We should not send aid to other parts of the world, such as Africa,
Asia or Latin America, because we do not really have vital security
interests there.
An overwhelming 77% disagreed (48% strongly) with that statement.
Similarly, in PIPA's November 1995 poll, 57% rejected an argument
against strengthening the UN based on national interest that said:
"Strengthening the UN is not a good idea because if the UN were
to become stronger, the US could become entangled in a system that
would inhibit it from full freedom to pursue its interests" (agree:
37%).
"National interest" arguments against contributing US troops to
peacekeeping operations also do not do well. For example, in a February-March 1998 PIPA poll only 35%
found convincing the argument: "Bosnia is far from the US, and we
have no real interests there. Therefore, it would be wrong to risk
the lives of American troops in a UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia"
(62% found it unconvincing). In a July 1994 PIPA poll that applied
this argument against sending troops to Rwanda, about the same low
number, 37%, found this argument convincing, while 62% found it
unconvincing. In the actual war situation
of Kosovo in May 1999, only slightly more--41%--found it convincing
(unconvincing: 56%).
When given the option to limit foreign involvements based on national
interest considerations, only a minority choose this option. In
a July 1994 PIPA poll, just 23% opted for intervening to stop genocide
"only when American interests are involved, while 65% opted for
intervening "always" (31%) or "in most cases" (34%)--irrespective
of US interests. A somewhat larger minority of 42% opted for contributing
US troops to UN peacekeeping operations "only when US interests
are involved," while 49% opted for doing so "as a general rule"
(just 5% opted for "never").
On the other hand, arguments that explicitly stress that the US
should sometimes take action irrespective of national interests
receive high marks. In the January 1995 PIPA poll, 76% agreed that
"We should send aid to starving people irrespective of whether it
will promote the national interest." In PIPA's April 1995 poll,
66% agreed that "When innocent civilians are suffering or are being
killed, and a UN peace operation is organized to try to address
the problem, in most cases the US should be willing to contribute
some troops, whether or not it serves the national interest."
Even the notion of making sacrifices for a collective good is supported
by an overwhelming majority. In PIPA's July 1994 poll, 84% said
that "sometimes the US should be willing to make some sacrifices
if this will help the world as a whole," while only 14% thought
that "the US should not make sacrifices in an effort to help the
world as a whole."
2) Sources of Support Back to top
Why do Americans support forms of engagement that do not bear directly
on US interests? One reason seems to be simple altruism. Americans
are quite responsive to humanitarian arguments in favor of engagement.
Moral arguments in support of contributing to peacekeeping operations
are found quite persuasive by the majority. A December 1995 CBS/New
York Times poll presented four different reasons to send US troops
to Bosnia, the one found to be a good reason by the largest number
(64%) was based on "stopping more people from being killed in this
war." Various PIPA polls on sending US troops to Bosnia also found
strong support for moral arguments. For example, in the April 1994
PIPA poll, 69% found convincing the following argument:
Over 200,000 people
have died in the war in Bosnia, over a million people have been
made refugees and countless atrocities have been committed. For
moral reasons, the US should contribute some of its troops, together
with other countries, to efforts to try to end the bloodshed.
The importance
of moral arguments for Americans was especially evident during the
Kosovo conflict. In May 1999, 69% found convincing an argument similar
to the one just quoted about Bosnia: "The Serbs' efforts at 'ethnic
cleansing' through killing many ethnic Albanians and driving hundreds
of thousands of them out of Kosovo is a form of genocide. The US
has a moral obligation to join in efforts to stop this genocide."
In June 1999, Pew tested how widely Americans might apply this kind
of argument to situations around the world. Pew divided the sample
into three parts. Each one-third sample heard the same question,
but with a different region of the world mentioned: "In the future,
do you think that the US and other western powers have a moral obligation
to use military force in (Europe / Africa / Asia), if necessary,
to prevent one group of people from committing genocide against
another, or don't you think so?" There was no meaningful difference
among the responses about different parts of the world: for Europe,
60% said yes; for Africa, 58%; and for Asia, 58%.
Moral arguments in favor of foreign aid also do well. In an October
1999 PIPA poll, a strong majority of 68% agreed with the argument
that "As one of the world's rich nations, the United States has
a moral responsibility toward poor nations to help them develop
economically and improve their people's lives"; 30% disagreed (PIPA,
January 1995: 67%; disagreed: 32%). A 1994 Belden and Russonello
poll found that 62% of respondents agreed that "Each of us has a
personal responsibility to help improve the lives of those in developing
countries."
Another factor that may contribute to support is globalism:—the
tendency for individuals to identify themselves with humanity or
the world as a whole much as they identify themselves with a nation.
In October 1993--less than two weeks after the deaths of US soldiers
in Somalia--77% agreed in a PIPA poll with this statement: "I regard
myself as a citizen of the world as well as a citizen of the United
States." In PIPA's October 1999 poll,
73% agreed.
It seems that when Americans respond to suffering, they are not
greatly influenced by national boundaries. In October 1999, when
respondents in a half sample were asked by PIPA how much it troubled
them to hear about hungry children inside the US, on a scale of
1 to 10, the average answer was 8.7 (January 1995: 8.6). When respondents
in the other half-sample were asked how much it troubled them to
hear about hungry children outside the US, the average answer was
only slightly lower 7.6 (January 1995: 7.2).
3) Balancing Domestic and International Priorities
Back to top
At the same time as they embrace positions derived from moral
and globalist values, Americans do feel conflict between domestic
and international priorities. In focus groups, many respondents
found troubling the question of whether the US should try to solve
international problems when there are still needy people at home.
Some would state categorically that the US should not make any such
efforts until domestic problems are solved first, such as a Nashville
man who said, "I think we should take care of home first and then
take care of problems abroad." But the same individual would insist
later that the US should definitely do something to help others
abroad. Participants were clearly groping for some framework to
resolve this conundrum.
This ambivalence is also reflected in polls. As mentioned, when
poll questions pose a priority choice, the majority will nearly
always opt for solving problems at home.
For example, in a January 1995 PIPA poll, 86% agreed with the statement:
"Taking care of problems at home is more important than giving foreign
aid. ”However, other questions revealed a highly different attitude.
In the same poll only 8% said that they wanted to eliminate foreign
aid.
There are two major ways that individuals resolve this problem.
One is in a framework that includes moral considerations but seeks
a balance with self-interest. Poll questions that offer moral arguments
for engagement, usually get strong majority support. But those that
simultaneously appeal to moral considerations and imply a limit
on US resource commitments get overwhelming support. For example,
in the January 1995 PIPA poll, 80% agreed that "The United States
should be willing to share at least a small portion of its wealth
with those in the world who are in great need."
For many focus group participants, the conundrum of whether to give
was resolved when they could specify the portion of resources that
would be devoted to international efforts. For example, a Fort Lee
woman who initially stressed solving problems in America first,
when discussing giving foreign aid said, "I think we should and
we can spare a little for [foreign aid], I'm sure we should do that.
Of course, we don't like to see any country die of hunger, or the
kids especially."
As will be explored in a variety of contexts in other sections of
this website (see peacekeeping, foreign aid), when polls offer respondents
the option of distributing resources to international efforts, very
few respondents will assign none, even to efforts that are not closely
tied to US interests. Indeed, in most cases, the majority will assign
amounts that are substantially greater than the actual amount.
4) Bridging National and Global Values
Back to top
The second major way that individuals resolve the problem of contributing
is by making a bridge between national values and global values.
Americans are very responsive to poll questions that make such a
link, especially in a long-term framework. In the October 1999 PIPA
poll, an overwhelming 78% agreed with the argument that:
Because the world
is so interconnected today, the US should participate in UN efforts
to maintain peace, protect human rights, and promote economic development.
Such efforts serve US interests because they help create a more
stable world that is less apt to have wars and is better for the
growth of trade and other US goals.
Only 39% agreed with a counterargument that:
...the world is
so big and complex that such [UN] efforts only make a minimal difference
with little benefit to the US. Therefore it is not really in the
US interest to participate in them.
Bridging arguments are very popular when applied to UN peacekeeping.
In a July 1994 PIPA poll, 75% agreed with the statement:
When thinking about
things like UN peacekeeping, whenever it can, the US should look
beyond its own self-interest and do what's best for the world as
a whole, because in the long run this will probably help make the
kind of world that is best for the US.
In the June 1996 PIPA poll, 78% agreed (50% strongly) that the
US should contribute to UN peacekeeping because: "...if we allow
things like genocide or the mass killings of civilians to go unaddressed,
it is more apt to spread and create more instability in the world
so that eventually our interests would be affected." PIPA's October 1999 poll tried
a counterargument: "The world is so big that we should not worry
too much if human rights violations are being committed in distant
parts of the world, because such things are unlikely to affect us." Only 20% found this convincing,
while 79% found it unconvincing.
When such arguments were used, support for sending US troops to
Bosnia became quite robust. In PIPA's February-March 1998
poll, a remarkably high 74% agreed with the statement:
If the war in Bosnia
had continued, there was a chance that it might have spread to other
countries in the region. While this chance may have been small,
the consequences could have been very grave for Europe and for US
interests. Therefore, contributing some US troops to the peacekeeping
operation in Bosnia is good insurance.
Only 41%
agreed with the counter-argument:
Although there
was some risk that the war in Bosnia might have spread to other
countries in the region, it is impossible to know whether this really
would have happened. We also cannot be sure the troops there are
actually going to solve the problem. Therefore, having troops in
Bosnia is not worth the risk and resources.
Perhaps the strongest bridging argument related to security concerns
is the one, discussed above, based on the classical principle of
collective security. Most Americans strongly embrace the idea that
the US should play its part in a system that guarantees that members
will defend one another against aggression. While a specific instance
may not be directly vital to US national interests, Americans seem
to agree that it is necessary to uphold the collective security
system that deters aggression against the US, believing that such
a system helps to maintain the kind of peaceful world that is conducive
to US interests.
Bridging arguments have also been popular in the context of foreign
aid. In the January 1995 poll, 63% agreed that the US should give
some foreign aid because "in the long run, helping Third World countries
develop is in the economic interest of the US." A majority also
rejects the counterargument that giving foreign aid is not a good
idea because it does not serve US interests. In a March 1993 poll
by Intercultural Communication, Inc., 67% disagreed with the idea
that it was "against our interests to help developing countries
because they will compete with us economically and politically."
In PIPA's January 1995 poll, respondents were asked:
In the years after
the Korean War, the US gave billions of dollars in aid to South
Korea. Some people feel that this is a good example of how we contributed
to developing a country that is now an ally and a trading partner.
Others feel that this aid helped South Korea take away our markets
by selling low-cost goods and therefore was a mistake. Do you think
it was a mistake to have given aid to South Korea?
Only 33% said it was a mistake, and 60% said it was not.
In focus groups, participants often made bridging arguments spontaneously.
A Nashville woman said, "We have a selfish reason for wanting to
help the world, that when there is trouble in the world it invariably
spreads." Sometimes respondents were quite emphatic and even apocalyptic.
For example, a man in Fort Lee, New Jersey said:
I say invest foreign
aid to help people get an education, give them tools to work...and
then they begin to build, and then they develop, and they end up
buying goods from us, we buy goods from them, they defend us; we
defend them. Maybe not short term, maybe not in my lifetime, maybe
not in my grandkids' lifetime, but down the road long term. So my
biggest concern with America is that if we don't do anything globally,
long term, to help out, then we're just going to die. And forget
about jobs--I won't have a job, my kid won't have a job, no one
will have a job. There' ll be no charity to give anybody anything.
There'll be nothing.
5) Concerns US is Spending Too Much on
International Efforts Relative to Domestic Needs Back to top
As mentioned, in the focus groups, especially in the first half
hour, some participants expressed the attitude that the US should
not spend on international efforts, especially on foreign aid, when
America still has pressing problems at home. It is likely that policymakers
regularly encounter this attitude in encounters with voters leaving
the impression that it is fundamental and widespread. However when
these outspoken focus group members were questioned, they quickly
clarified that they are not proposing that the US eliminate foreign
aid and other programs--they simply want to make the size of such
expenditures more appropriate given other domestic needs. Clearly,
the question of how much should go to international efforts is troubling,
both as a moral conundrum and because many do believe that international
efforts do ultimately serve US interests.
Further questioning, though, invariably reveals that this conundrum
is largely derived from misperceptions. Asked to estimate how much
of the federal budget or their tax dollars goes to international
programs, nearly all respondents grossly overestimate. When asked
what an appropriate percentage would be, they propose an amount
that it is significantly less than their estimate, but usually several
times more than the actual amount.
When told the actual amount, respondents are often stunned. Some
laugh, some get angry that they have been somehow misled, a few
initially hold to the position that whatever it is, it is too much,
but in most cases the group moves fairly quickly to the consensus
that the actual amount is acceptable. Some who originally complained
it was too low even insist that it should be more!
Other sections of this website show this same pattern repeated in
different areas of US international engagement. Perhaps most vivid
is the subject of foreign aid. Numerous polls reveal that strong
majorities feel the US spends too much on foreign aid and want to
cut it. When asked to estimate how much goes to foreign aid--either
as a percentage of the federal budget, as a percentage of GNP, or
in comparison to other budget items--respondents in all demographic
groups, including the most educated, overestimate by large factors.
When asked to specify appropriate levels, using a variety of methods,
they consistently set levels many times higher than the actual levels.
And when presented with the actual amounts, either as a fact or
as a hypothetical, overwhelming majorities find them quite acceptable
or too low. When respondents are taken through the different components
of foreign aid spending, most programs (and all that give to poor
countries) are found to be acceptable by overwhelming majorities.
In some polls, though not all, modest majorities have expressed
the view that the US spends too much money on UN peacekeeping. Again
the same pattern prevails: extreme overestimations of the actual
amount, proposals for "cutting" to lower levels that are actually
higher than current levels, and comfort with the actual level once
presented.
In short, it seems that gross misperceptions dampen support for
international programs and also obscure the underlying support for
international engagement in principle. Once these misperceptions
are cleared up, the underlying support reasserts itself.
|
