What kind of role do Americans want the US to play in the world: Do they want the US to disengage from the world in the wake of the Cold War, or do they want it to be the dominant world leader?

Summary: The American public rejects the idea that with the end of the Cold War, the US should disengage from the world. At the same time, a majority also rejects the dominant world leader role for the US. Rather, the public supports continued engagement, but favors much greater emphasis on cooperative and multilateral forms of international involvement in which the US contributes its 'fair share'’along with other countries. 

Report Sections
1) Introduction
2) Rejection of the Dominant World Leader Role
3) Support for Cooperative Engagement
4) Working through the UN
5) Relying on Multilateral Approaches
6) Collective Security 
7) Working through NATO
8) Concerns About Whether the US is Contributing its Fair Share

1) Introduction   Back to top

A review of polling data reveals little evidence that the American public is going through a phase of wanting the US to withdraw from the world. Historically, a substantial minority of Americans have registered support for such a position. But with the end of the Cold War, there is no real evidence that this has become a majority position and only scant evidence that this minority has even increased in size. 

Perhaps most significant is trend line data derived from poll questions that have been asked in the exact same form over many years. For example, various polling organizations have for several decades now posed the question, "Do you think the US should take an active part in world affairs or stay out of world affairs?" During the Cold War, Americans rather consistently, by a two-to-one margin, embraced the position that the US should "take an active part." With the end of the Cold War (usually associated with the turn of the decade) this attitude has remained largely unchanged except for an upward spike around the time of the Gulf War. Most recently, in a June 1999 poll by Gallup, 61% said that the US should "take an active part," with just 34% saying the US should "stay out" of world affairs. 

As a general rule when respondents are presented just one argument, rather than a pair, and asked whether they agree or disagree, there is a stronger tendency to agree. Nonetheless, trend line questions that pose one-sided arguments in favor of disengagement are consistently rejected by the majority. Over the last decades, the majority has rejected by a two-to-one margin the argument that "we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not." Most recently, in a September 2000 poll conducted by the Center on Policy Attitudes, 66% rejected this argument. Since 1956 the National Election Study has presented the argument: "This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world." In November 1998 an overwhelming 81% disagreed.

On the other hand, one-sided arguments affirming the value of engagement receive overwhelming support. Echoing the above-mentioned pair of statements, Times Mirror repeatedly over a number of years presented the argument: "It’is best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs." During the Cold War years approximately nine out of ten agreed. This proportion was unchanged in 1994, and 1997, with 91% agreeing in 1997. In the 1990s there was a marked increase in the percentage saying that they agree with this position "completely" (48% in 1997).  Most recently, 88% agreed in October 1999 (45% strongly).

Poll questions that do elicit a seemingly isolationist response are those that ask respondents to prioritize international and domestic problems: domestic problems are almost always assigned a higher priority. For example, a September 1997 Pew poll found that an overwhelming 72% agreed that "we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home" (68% in March 1999). Since the respondent only has the option of agreeing or disagreeing, the response may only tell us that he or she wants to put more emphasis on problems at home, not necessarily that he or she wants to reduce overseas efforts. The fact that other poll responses show majority support for overseas engagement lends support to this interpretation. 

Furthermore, contrary to the widespread idea that Americans do not like to see their elected representatives devote time to international problems when there are problems at home, the majority feels they should spend a substantial portion of their time on world affairs. In a June/September 1996 PIPA poll, the median respondent felt that the president should devote 30% of his time to international issues, while a congressional representative should devote 25%. 

The majority of Americans also tends to approve of more concrete forms of international engagement. For example, there seems to be substantial support for maintaining a strong US diplomatic presence in the world. In a June 1996 PIPA poll, when presented a pair of opposing arguments, only 36% opted for the argument favoring taking a more isolationist approach to world affairs. 

Other sections of this website explore attitudes on a variety of other concrete forms of engagement. In each case a fairly strong majority of Americans is supportive. The section on the United Nations shows that an overwhelming majority supports US involvement in the United Nations and would like to see the UN become stronger. The section on peacekeeping shows that a fairly strong majority supports UN peacekeeping and US participation in it, though they may have reservations about the potential success of some specific missions. Strong majorities do criticize aspects of the US foreign aid program, while grossly overestimating its size, as is discussed in section on foreign aid, but overwhelming majorities embrace foreign aid in principle and only a tiny minority wants to eliminate it. 

2) Rejection of the Dominant World Leader Role  Back to top

While most Americans clearly reject the idea that the US should withdraw from the world, there is nonetheless criticism of the current US role in the world. A very strong majority feels that the US is playing the role of dominant world leader, or hegemon, more than it should be. 

This feeling is particularly pronounced in the rejection of the US playing the role of ‘'world policeman.' In focus groups, respondents spontaneously made this argument. In COPA's July 2000 poll, 68% said "the US is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be." This rejection of a world policeman role for the US has been in place for some time. Even at the height of the Gulf War in March 1991, asked whether "the US should be playing the role of world policeman," 75% said "no" with just 21% saying "yes". While the "world policeman" idea fared a little better when it was later re-asked, it was always rejected by majorities (60%, February 1992; 57%, January 1993; 53%, March 1999, Los Angeles Times). In a June 1995 ATIF poll, when asked who should be "the policeman of the world," only 19% of respondents said the US, while 76% said the UN. 

Rejection of the world policeman role appears to be sustained by the public's belief that other countries have grown overly dependent on the US for their defense. When asked, "Do you feel that countries that receive protection from US military capabilities are doing enough to protect themselves, or do you feel that they rely too much on the US?" an overwhelming 89% said that these countries "rely too much on the US" (PIPA, November 1995). 

Polls have also asked whether the US has the ability to play the role of "world policeman--that is, to fight violations of international law and aggression wherever they occur." The number saying "no" grew from 47% to 63% between 1991 and 1994.  

Preserving the world leader role for the US has also not been an effective rationale for engagement. A December 1995 CBS/New York Times poll provided four different reasons to send US troops to Bosnia, asking whether they were "good enough" or not. The lowest-scoring reason of the four was "maintaining the United States role as a world leader," which only 29% found "good enough." The highest-scoring reason, embraced by 64%, was based on humanitarian considerations. In a comparable series of questions about the Kosovo intervention in April 1999 (NPR/Kaiser/ Harvard), those who thought the intervention was in the national interest (55%) were offered reasons why this was the case. Only 37% thought a "very important" reason was that "the credibility of NATO is on the line," while 69% found "very important" a reason linked to collective security ("It could prevent the outbreak of a larger war)".

Opposition to a hegemonic role is so strong that if Americans are only given the options of that role and disengagement, the majority is likely to choose the latter. For example, in a January 1994 poll, asked to choose between two opposing statements, only 27% endorsed the argument: "Because the United States is the world's strongest and richest country, it has the responsibility to take the leading role in world affairs." Sixty-seven percent preferred the statement: "Because the United States has limited resources and its own problems at home, it needs to reduce its involvement in world affairs" (ABC/Washington Post). 

Americans also do not accept the idea that as the world hegemon the US has a special obligation to carry a disproportionate burden of the cost for keeping the peace. In PIPA's June 1996 poll, 80% rejected the view that "as the sole remaining superpower...the US [should] spend a larger percentage of its...GNP on defense than its allies" in favor of the notion that "all of the industrialized countries should spend about the same percentage." 

Another factor undermining support for the world leader role is that many Americans view the role as illegitimate and containing the kind of hubris that led the US into Vietnam. In focus groups, respondents regularly complained that the US has historically taken an arrogant and overreaching attitude in the world. An Atlanta man said: 

We re acting like we are the world's police, and why? No one asked us to. I mean, we re spending money, going in and invading territories that, really, we have no business going into. 

3) Support for Cooperative Engagement  Back to top

If the majority does not want the US to withdraw from the world or to be the dominant world leader, what does it want? The answer is actually fairly clear: Americans support the US participating actively in cooperative international efforts in which it would contribute its fair share. 

In a July 2000 PIPA poll, respondents were presented with three options for America's role in the world. Just 15% chose the option that "the US should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." Similarly, only 11% embraced the idea that "as the sole remaining superpower, the US should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." However, an overwhelming 72% endorsed the view that "The US should do its fair share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries." 

In September 1997, Pew asked what kind of leadership role Americans would like to see the US play in the world. Consistent with PIPA's 1996 results, only 11% embraced the isolationist position that the US "shouldn't play any leadership role." Similarly, only 12% favored the United States being "the single world leader." However, an overwhelming majority of 73% favored the US playing "a shared leadership role." Those who opted for a shared leadership role were also asked if they wanted the US to be the most active, or about as active as other leading nations, and 50% of the total sample preferred the US be "no more or less active." When Times Mirror asked the same questions in 1995 and in 1993, similar results were obtained.

A majority prefers shared leadership with its limitations to a strategy of 'going it alone,' even when reminded of the shortcomings of the international institutions where shared leadership has to take place. In October 1999 PIPA asked respondents to choose between two statements. One argued that

As the world becomes more interconnected, and problems such as terrorism and the environment are of a more international nature, it will be increasingly necessary for the US to work through international institutions.

The other statement pointed to well-known drawbacks of such institutions:

International institutions are slow and bureaucratic, and often used as places for other countries to criticize and block the US. It is better for the US to try and solve problems like terrorism and the environment on our own instead.

Though this criticism had some resonance, only 39% said it came closer to their point of view, while 56% preferred the statement that "it will be increasingly necessary for the US to work through international institutions."

  When the public is asked about international engagement and US leadership in a way that does not imply American hegemony, it responds very differently than it does when hegemony is implied. In an October 1995 Times Mirror poll, 64% said "the US should play a leading role in dealing with the world's problems." 

When US engagement is put in the context of cooperative efforts, support can become overwhelming. For example, in an October 1993 PIPA poll, even just days after the deaths of the 18 US Rangers in a firefight in Somalia, 88% agreed with the statement: "Because the world is so interconnected today, it is important for the US to participate, together with other countries, in efforts to maintain peace and protect human rights" (89% when asked again in February-April 1998). 

4) Working Through the UN  Back to top

As will be discussed in greater detail in the section on the UN, this support for cooperative efforts leads to extremely strong support for the UN and for US participation in it. There is overwhelming approval for strengthening the UN and surprisingly little concern that doing so will undermine US sovereignty. When asked, "Now that the Cold War has ended, how important do you think it is to cooperate with other countries by working through the UN?," 89% said it was "extremely" (50%) or "somewhat" (39%) important (CBS/New York Times, March 1994).  A COPA poll asked this question again in September 2000 and found a similar 81% saying it was "extremely" (41%) or “"somewhat"” (40%) important. [In March 1999 65% agreed that "the United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations"; only 26% disagreed (Pew).] 

Even when respondents are first reminded of the arguments against strengthening the UN and other international institutions, majorities still prefer to do so. In October 1999 PIPA began a series of questions by saying:

Some say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we need to strengthen international institutions to deal with shared problems. Others say that this would only create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies.

Despite this introduction, 67% thought the UN needs to be strengthened (does not: 30%) and 56% thought the World Court needs to be strengthened (does not: 25%; don't know, 18%).

Similarly, the same poll asked respondents to choose between two statements about the future role of international institutions. Sixty-one percent chose: "To deal with global problems such as terrorism and environmental dangers, it will be increasingly necessary to get countries to change what they do inside their borders." Only 35% preferred the alternate statement, based on the value of sovereignty: "What countries do inside their borders is their own business. International institutions should not try to tell countries what they should do."

Support for working through the UN is particularly pronounced in regard to the potential use of military force. In an April 1995 PIPA poll, an overwhelming 89% agreed that: 

When there is a problem in the world that requires the use of military force, it is generally best for the US to address the problem together with other nations working through the UN, rather than going it alone. 

In contrast, only 29% embraced the argument that when military force is needed "...it is better for the US to act on its own rather than working through the UN, because the US can move more quickly and probably more successfully." 

In focus groups, many participants were unequivocal in their rejection of the US acting alone to maintain world order. As a Kalamazoo woman said "I think that s where...we always go wrong with this idea of ‘'alone'...I mean, why do we have to be the one who is gonna go in?" 

As we will discuss in greater depth in the section of this website on peacekeeping, strong majorities feel that UN peacekeeping is a way to help alleviate the burden so that the US can limit itself to a "fair share" of the effort. In the April 1995 PIPA poll, 86% agreed with the statement: "The only way for the US to not always be the ‘'world policeman' is to allow the UN to perform some policing functions. UN peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries." 

5) Relying on Multilateral Approaches  Back to top

To truly move away from a hegemonic role and not withdraw from the world requires that the US rely more on the other members of a cooperative multilateral system. Strong evidence suggests that Americans are ready to do so. 

In a November 1995 PIPA poll, respondents were presented with some of the complexities of relying on allies to carry part of the responsibility. They were asked: 

Right now the US has a world-wide military presence which protects its interests, such as oil in the Persian Gulf region. US allies who share these interests, like the Europeans and Japan, also benefit from this US military presence. Some people feel that these allies should contribute more military forces to protect these interests so that the US can reduce its burden. Others do not like this idea because, they say, we cannot be fully confident that allies will effectively protect shared interests. Do you favor or oppose the idea of allies taking over some of these responsibilities so that the US can reduce its presence abroad? 

An overwhelming 79% favored having the allies take over some of these responsibilities, with only 19% opposed. 

To test this attitude with a concrete case, respondents were asked to consider the possibility of having the Persian Gulf policed by "a multinational naval patrol with ships from different countries as well as the US." The complexities of this idea were also introduced with the comment: "Most likely this would reduce the burden on the US but also mean having a shared command with other countries." Nevertheless, 72% said they would favor such a multinational naval patrol over the US doing the patrolling on its own. 

Respondents also showed strong support for relying on allies to help protect third parties. When presented four different options for dealing with US commitments to protect other countries, only 7% wanted to "withdraw" US commitments, while only 5% wanted to maintain its commitments by acting "primarily on its own." 

An overwhelming majority favored more multilateral approaches. The largest number, 49%, favored the US maintaining its commitments but "whenever possible" acting "together with allies or through the UN." Thirty-eight percent wanted to see the US "change its commitments to protect countries so that it is only committed to protecting them together with allies or through the UN." 

A separate sample was posed a similar question, but was asked instead what capabilities US defense spending should support. Offered three options, just 10% wanted the US to "only spend enough to protect itself but not to protect other countries." Eighteen percent wanted the US to "spend enough so that it can protect itself and other countries on its own." A strong majority of 71% wanted the US to "only spend enough to protect itself and to join in efforts to protect countries together with allies or through the UN."  This question was asked again in July 2000 by COPA:  at that time, 11% wanted the US to spend only enough to protect itself; 13% wanted the US to spend enough to protect itself and other countries on its own, while 74% wanted the US to only spend enough to protect itself and to join in multilateral efforts. 

This preference for acting multilaterally was also very apparent in PIPA s November 1995 poll, when respondents were asked about defending Saudi Arabia and South Korea specifically. In most cases, the majority would only want to defend these countries as part of a multilateral operation. Scenarios were presented in which Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia and North Korea attacked South Korea. In each case, half the sample was asked if it would favor "the US intervening with military force to stop this aggression by itself, if necessary." For Saudi Arabia 60% of respondents said they would favor such action, but only 33% said they would favor it for South Korea. When this was followed up with a question about whether respondents would "favor the US contributing military forces together with other countries to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression," support jumped up to 77% for Saudi Arabia and 70% for South Korea. 

When this procedure was reversed so that respondents were first asked about participating in a multilateral operation, 76% favored it for Saudi Arabia and 68% favored it for South Korea. When they were asked, "If other countries in the UN declined to participate, would you favor or oppose the US taking action by itself?," only 33% favored taking action in Saudi Arabia and 21% in South Korea. This low support for unilateral action is confirmed by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations' November 1998 survey, which asked questions that did not mention any allies and found 46% favoring the "use of US troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia," and only 30% favoring the use of US troops if North Korea invaded South Korea. 

For multilateral efforts to effectively reduce the demands on the US, these efforts would ultimately need to draw on three of the most advanced countries in the world--Japan, Germany, and Russia. Because of fear of their military potential, as well as practical concern for constitutional limitations on Japan and Germany, including these countries in military operations has been controversial. However, the majority of the American public seems quite clearly in favor of doing so. 

Respondents were asked if they would like to see Germany or Japan contribute troops or just money in the event a UN-sponsored military force is formed to deal with a threat to Persian Gulf oil supplies. For Germany, only 23% favored simply contributing money, while 70% favored contributing troops. For Japan, 37% favored simply contributing money while 60% favored contributing troops. When respondents who favored the money-only option were asked, "What if this would mean that the US would then need to contribute more troops," the number holding to the position that Germany should not contribute troops dropped to 9% and for Japan to 13%. 

6) Collective Security  Back to top

Underlying the public s support for the UN and multilateral approaches to the problem of security, there is fundamental agreement with the principle of collective security. In November 1995, PIPA presented the following question: 

The UN was established on the principle of collective security, which says that when a UN member is attacked by another country, UN members should help defend the attacked nation. Some say the US should contribute its military forces to such UN efforts because then potential aggressors will know that aggression will not succeed. Others say the US should not contribute troops to such efforts because American troops may be put at risk in operations that are not directly related to US interests. Do you think the US should or should not contribute troops to UN efforts to help defend UN members if they are attacked? 

Sixty-nine percent said that the US should contribute troops to such UN efforts, while 23% said the US should not. 

The principle of collective security has also been found to be a potent argument in favor of US participation in a peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. In a May 1993 PIPA poll, 68% found convincing (45% very) the argument: “"The UN was established around the principle of collective security which says that when one nation attacks another, this is a violation of international law and UN members have an obligation to help defend the attacked nation. Since Serbia is making direct attacks on Bosnia as well as sending weapons to the Serbian rebels, members of the UN should help defend the Bosnian government." 
 
 

7) Working through NATO  Back to top

The enthusiasm for multilateral approaches to security does extend to NATO as well. In a December 1995 Wirthlin Group poll, a very strong 76% said that it is important for the US to be "an active member" of NATO (though not quite as much as the 82% who felt that way about the UN). In September 1996, PIPA found that 67% felt that NATO is "essential to our security." 

Attitudes about NATO expansion also reflect support for the general principle of collective security and multilateral cooperation. In several polls, support for expanding NATO to include Eastern European countries has ranged from a plurality to fairly strong majorities, largely depending on the wording of the questions (PIPA September 1996, February 1998; Pew January 1997, September 1997, March 1998). But most revealing are the responses to other questions. In the September 1996 PIPA poll, ten arguments in favor of NATO expansion were presented, and respondents were asked to rate them. The most popular argument, rated as convincing by 77% (with 48% feeling that way strongly), was that, "It is better to include Eastern European countries rather than to exclude them, because peace is more likely if we all communicate and work together" (February 1998: 80%). 

The second strongest "pro" argument was based on a core principle of collective security: 69% found convincing the argument that "It is important for potential aggressors to know that they cannot get away with conquering countries" (February 1998: 75%). Sixty-five percent also found convincing (28% strongly) the argument that through expansion "NATO will be in a better position to resolve conflicts between [Eastern European] countries." 

The least popular arguments in favor of NATO expansion were those that stressed the Russian threat and the geopolitical competition with Russia. The argument that won fewest supporters, found convincing by just 35%, was that "Russia is very weak these days and this creates an opportunity for NATO to expand into Eastern Europe and consolidate our victory in the Cold War" (unconvincing 61%; February 1998: convincing 34%, unconvincing 60%). 

Among the ten arguments against NATO expansion the most popular, rated convincing by 62% (31% strongly), was that NATO is still too much a military alliance and not inclusive enough. It said: "Instead of expanding NATO, something new should be developed that includes Russia rather than treating Russia as an enemy" (February 1998, 60%).  

Perhaps what makes most clear the strength of the majority s collective security orientation is the majority support for including Russia in NATO. CNN/USA Today found 54% support (January 1994) for the idea, the Fletcher School found 62% support (April 1996), and PIPA found 51% support (February 1998). PIPA also asked about including Russia in NATO once Russia has demonstrated that it is a stable democracy support reached 64%. 

This inclusive attitude has not, however, undermined support for protecting allies against aggression. In the PIPA poll, respondents were asked how they would feel about contributing US troops to defend Poland against an attack by Russia, assuming that Poland had been admitted to NATO 69% said they would support doing so. 

Though polling results tell a fairly clear story, it should be noted that for many Americans, this consensus for cooperative engagement is not fully crystallized. In focus groups, when participants complained that the US was playing the role of dominant world leader or that the US was doing too much, they often made statements that sounded isolationist. But then the same individuals would also strongly reject the idea that the US should withdraw from the world. When they, or somebody else in the group, tried to balance these concerns by articulating a "fair share" role for the US in multilateral efforts to promote peace and progress, a strong consensus usually emerged. 

8) Concerns About Whether the US is Contributing its Fair Share  Back to top

Among Americans there is a widespread belief that the US is doing more than its fair share internationally.  COPA's July 2000 poll asked whether "In recent efforts to solve world problems, as compared to other countries, do you think the US has done its fair share, more than its fair share, or less than its fair share?"  An overwhelming 71% said the US had done more than its fair share; only 24% thought it had done its fair share; and a miniscule 3% thought it had done less than its fair share. 

In focus groups, some participants immediately launched into this argument. Polls have found that 60% feel the US pays more than its fair share for "UN activities" (June 1995, Times Mirror), 50% feel the US is paying more than its fair share for UN dues (June 1996, PIPA), 60% said the US contributes more than its fair share of troops to UN peacekeeping (April 1995, PIPA), and 81% feel the US gives more than it should as compared to other industrialized countries for development assistance (January 1995, PIPA).  When asked in February-April 1998 whether the US and the European countries are each doing their fair share in maintaining peace in the world, 81% said the US was doing more than its fair share.

But these judgments of unfairness seem to rest on major misperceptions, because polls show that many Americans dramatically overestimate the US share of international efforts. The median respondent in PIPA's February-April 1998 poll estimated that the US contributes 60% of all the aid given by the wealthy countries to "poor countries to help them develop their economies." In fact, the US gives 13% of development aid, according to the OECD. In the April 1995 poll, the median respondent estimated that the US was contributing 40% of all UN peacekeeping troops, while the actual number at the time was only 4%. In the January 1995 PIPA poll, 81% estimated that the US contributes more of its GNP to development aid than most other industrialized countries, whereas the US gives the lowest percentage of all. 

Particularly interesting is the fact that when Americans are asked to set an appropriate US share, they often set a level much higher than the actual level. For economic aid to developing countries given by all wealthy nations, the median respondent in the February-April 1998 PIPA poll said that the US should give about a 40% share--more than twice the actual amount. In January 1995, 81% said the US should give about the same amount or more of its GNP for development aid than other industrialized countries, and in April 1995, the median respondent said the US should contribute about 20% of all the troops to UN peacekeeping--both dramatically higher than the actual levels. 

When Americans are given correct information about the actual levels of US contributions relative to other countries, criticism falls off sharply. After hearing in June 1996 that, in fact, the US contributes 25% of UN dues because the US economy is 25% of the world economy as measured by GNP, 56% found this accounting fair, while just 37% found it unfair. In an April 1995 PIPA poll, when asked how they would feel about contributing 4% of the troops to UN peacekeeping (the actual number at the time), only 9% of respondents thought this proportion was too much. 

The belief that the US is contributing more than its fair share can obscure support for engagement in unpredictable ways. For example, despite fairly strong support for the general principle of contributing US troops to peacekeeping operations, until early 1998 most polls showed the public divided on contributing troops to the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. In a January 1996 Pew poll, respondents were asked whether they "approve or disapprove of President Clinton's decision to send 20,000 US troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force," without stating that other countries would be supplying the majority of the troops. Forty-eight percent said they approved, while 49% said they disapproved. The same question was repeated with half the sample in the June 1996 PIPA poll and produced a similar result--51% approved, 44% disapproved . 

In the PIPA poll, the other half sample was asked the question in another way. They were asked to specify what percentage of the Bosnia troops they would like to see the US contribute, with "none" being a clearly stated option. In this context, 68% said the US should contribute some troops, while only 30% said that the US should contribute none. This suggests that some respondents in the standard ‘"approve-disapprove" question refrained from expressing support because they disapproved of the level of US participation that they assume to be the case not because they necessarily opposed participation per se. This interpretation is confirmed by the finding that the median respondent estimated that the US was contributing 40% of the troops for the Bosnia operation, while among those who favored contributing some troops, the median preferred level was 25%. 

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